LÉ Cliona - Boiler Room Fire - 29 May 1962 - Review

LAST UPDATE: MONDAY: 13 FEBRUARY 2023

After many years trying to get access to the LÉ Cliona Enquiry file Shipmate Bill Mynes finally achieved his objective, and on Tuesday 26 July 2022 was granted access by the military archives to view selected declassified transcripts regarding the investigation held by the Department of Defence into the boiler room fire, which occurred on board LÉ Cliona on the 29 May 1962. (NOTE: Several confidential submissions to the LÉ Cliona enquiry remain classified). In this regard, our website has been updated. Shipmate Mynes also indicated that he had always felt guilty as he thought he may have done something wrong, and this had troubled him since the fire on Cliona in 1962. On the contrary, Bill Mynes never did anything wrong or failed in his duty. The conclusion of the review begun in 2015 which led to 4 scrolls of commendation to be awarded and the subsequent unveiling of the LÉ Cliona plinth on the Naval base in September 2016 which honours all the Cliona crew for their efforts, is probably the best that could be achieved. It is also likely the outcome to the review begun in 2015 by Minister for Defence Simon Coveney T.D. was determined by the recommendations of the 1962 Naval Court of Enquiry. Indeed there is such a conflict in the sworn evidence proffered by some witnesses, that it is unsurprising the Minister took the limited action he did. However, it would have been more prudent for the Department of Defence to issue Commendations to all the crew of LÉ Cliona who deserved to be issued with scrolls of commendation for their efforts in returning their ship safely to port, rather than just the four members of crew selected. Following access to declassified transcripts regarding the Naval Court of Enquiry (1962-1964) convened to investigate the LÉ Cliona Boiler Room fire, this page has been updated:
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EXTRACT COURT OF ENQUIRY convened by Capt. T. McKenna, Commanding Officer Naval Service on the 30th May 1962 to investigate and report upon the fire which occurred in the Boiler Room of LÉ “Cliona” at sea during Anti-Submarine Exercises on Tuesday 29th May 1962:
In his sworn evidence CPO Egan states:
"I climbed over the divisional bulkhead down onto the platform of No 1 Boiler Room ladder and from there onto the plates (No 1 Boiler Room deck)": " I put out all furnace sprayers which were still lighting - shut down the fan engine and fuel pump"
Comment:
Lt O'Mahony leading the Damage Control Party, gave evidence that "About this time No 1 boiler room cleared of smoke but it was not possible to enter due to the heat". A conflict in evidence exists, which raises doubts as to the testimony sworn by Egan that he had entered Boiler Room No 1 with no protection when the boiler room was effectively too hot to access according to Lt. O'Mahony.
NOTE: In his statement to Peter Mulvany dated 31 August 2015, Mr Egan does not record the action described here:

CPO Egan states in his evidence:
"The deck hatch over No. 2 Boiler was shut and there was a heavy concentration of smoke on the boiler top"
Comment:
A photograph extracted from a film recorded by Telefis Eireann on LÉ Cliona during the fire shows Stoker Mulligan fighting the fire from within the top of Boiler Room No 2 deck hatch which was OPEN, NOT CLOSED:
NOTE: In his statement to Peter Mulvany dated 31 August 2015, Mr Egan does not record the action described here:

CPO Egan states in evidence:
"I felt my way over the boiler (No 2) top down to the starboard side of the boiler"
Comment:
There is no evidence from any personnel including Stoker Mulligan who was fighting the fire from the top and inside of Boiler Room No 2 roof space that CPO Egan had entered or was seen in No 2 Boiler Room roof space. CPO Egan's testimony is uncorroborated in this regard.
NOTE: In his statement to Peter Mulvany dated 31 August 2015, Mr Egan does not record the action described here:

Captains Standing Orders regarding Fire and Damage Control:
Paragraph 191 refers to action when a boiler room must be abandoned (EVACUATED), it states:- (a) Stop the oil fuel pump (b) Stop fan engine (c) Open steam drench valve.
Lt. Cdr. Henry Commanding officer L.E. LÉ Cliona: in his evidence stated: "The damage control party under Lt. O’Mahony were playing a hose into the Boiler Room and I could see the steam that had been used to drench the flames. The fire appeared to be coming under control":
Executive officer Lieut. P. O’Mahony: in his evidence stated: "I TOOK CHARGE OF THE PARTY, and organised the fighting of the fire. In the meantime the water hose and portable foam fire extinguishers were being used, as was steam drenching, the noise of which made verbal communication difficult.
NOTE: Hosing water on a hot bulkhead will generate steam and the resulting cacophony of noise as the bulkhead and boilers were cooling down would have given the impression that the steam drenching system had been activated:
Comment:
As personnel were fighting the boiler room fire with hoses within the Boiler Room spaces
, Chief Petty Officer E.R.A. Egan and Chief Petty Officer Stoker O'Callaghan opened the steam drench valves located on the boat deck, thereby recklessly endangering the lives of the damage control party and other members of crew. If correctly activated, fatal consequences could have ensued from the release of superheated steam into a confined space where personnel were located.
NOTE: However, while researching this project information was received that the steam drenching system was in fact not operable from the boat deck on LÉ Cliona as the hand wheels had been deliberately removed from the spindles on both No 1 and No 2 steam drench valves by Chief E.R.A Egan. Apparently Egan admitted some time after the fire that he had been concerned the steam drench valves could be mishandled and decided to disable their operation by removing the hand wheels of both No 1 and No 2 Boiler steam drench valves making them inoperable from the boat deck. (Interfering with fire fighting equipment has legal consequences):
NOTE: In his statement to Peter Mulvany dated 31 August 2015, Mr Egan does not record the action described here:

Significantly, on the 19 October 2015 and on the 03 October 2016 questions were put to Warrant Officer Maurice Egan NS (Rtd) regarding the issue of steam drench valves on LÉ Cliona. Mr Egan never replied: Extracts here for the record:
Extract: Letter dated 19 October 2015 to Warrant Officer Maurice Egan NS (Rtd):
“As the report of Captain Tom McKenna 31 May 1962 clearly states, inter alia, that all the main electrical leads and pipes through it (No 2 Boiler) were destroyed, and as I understand from boiler fire accidents in naval vessels of other countries, the boilers on Flower Class Corvettes may have been fitted with a manually operated drenching fire prevention system in case of fire, which may also be fed in an emergency via the header tanks, and as it appears from your letter that you were the ERA in charge: Can you explain why the drench valve, if fitted on Cliona, was not used? Was that defective ? and if so why?”
NO Reply was received from Mr Egan:

Extract: Letter dated 03 October 2016 to Warrant Officer Maurice Egan NS (Rtd):
"Of other concern is the issue of a missing steam drench valve wheel on board Cliona which was a crucial fire prevention piece of equipment to be used in case of a fire emergency in the boiler room. Consequently, in my previous communication, I put the following to you":
"Quote: “As the report of Captain Tom McKenna 31 May 1962 clearly states, inter alia, that all the main electrical leads and pipes through it (No 2 Boiler) were destroyed, and as I understand from boiler fire accidents in naval vessels of other countries, the boilers on Flower Class Corvettes may have been fitted with a manually operated drenching fire prevention system in case of fire, which may also be fed in an emergency via the header tanks, and as it appears from your letter that you were the ERA in charge: Can you explain why the drench valve, if fitted on Cliona, was not used? Was that defective ? and if so why?" Unquote":
"As you have not commented in reply, I put it to you that the reason the steam drench valve was not used was because the wheels were removed from the spindle making them redundant and inoperable from the boat deck? I also put it to you that it was your responsibility as CPO ERA in charge to make sure all fire prevention equipment was in situ, accessible and operable? I put it to you that your failure to do so jeopardised the safety of the crew of Cliona? and but for the quick reaction of Pat O’Mahony who immediately entered the boiler room putting his life in danger to tackle the fire on his own, an action corroborated by others, it could have been a disaster”:
"On the 10th June 1948, Pursuant to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) the Irish Government appointed its High Commissioner in London as plenipotentiary and thereby accepted in common agreement with other countries uniform principles and rules as directed for the Safety of Life at Sea. You should be aware of the legal imperative pursuant to this convention which the Irish Naval Service in 1962 was also bound by, in particular REGULATION 47: (a) QUOTE: “Where provision is made for the injection of gas or steam into cargo spaces or boiler rooms for fire extinguishing purposes, the necessary pipes for conveying the gas or steam shall be provided with CONTROL VALVES OR COCKS WHICH SHALL BE READILY ACCESSIBLE FROM THE DECK IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE” End of Quote.
"I therefore put it to you that as the Chief Petty Officer ERA responsible on board Cliona at the time you should have faced a General Court Martial post incident and have allegations tested and decided upon by a convened military tribunal of the Irish Defences Forces, as in my opinion the evidence suggests negligence on your part?"
NO Reply was received from Mr Egan:

Naval Service Statement to the Department of Defence: Conclusion Dated 06 July 1964:
"The fire fighting equipment on board (LÉ Cliona) was adequate and operated efficiently except for one unit of the foam making equipment which was damaged in the fire and a forward section of the fire main"
Comment: Untrue: The steam drench valves had been made inoperable from the boat deck by Chief E.R.A Egan.

"The court considered the actions of Lt. O'Mahony, Chief Stoker O'Callaghan and Chief E.R.A Egan were mainly responsible for the quick and effective control of the fire. In this respect Chief E.R.A Egan deserves special mention"
Comment: Having examined the Naval Court of Enquiry transcripts, and received other information, Chief Stoker O'Callaghan, Chief E.R.A Egan, Leading Stoker Banim and Lt. Foley should have faced a courts-martial and have allegations tested more rigorously. The subsequent Naval Service Enquiry into the LÉ Cliona Boiler Room fire was primarily set up to protect the standing of the service and its adjudication was light touch and foreseeable. Indeed the fact that Sub Lt Johnny Doyle was detailed to locate civilians who had been on board LÉ Cliona during the fire and have them sign disclaimer forms illustrates the Naval Service was more interested in avoiding potential claimants for compensation and wanted to bury any critical investigation/report?

Warrant Officer Egan NS (Rtd):
Following publication of a story in the Irish Examiner "Global support to honour Irish Navy veterans" by journalist Sean O'Riordan on Wednesday 26 August 2015, a phone call was received from Warrant Officer Engineer Maurice Egan (Retd.) Irish Naval Service, who had been the Chief Petty Officer E.R.A. (Engine Room Articifer) on board LÉ Cliona during the boiler room fire 29 May 1962. Mr Egan robustly challenged the narrative published in the Irish Examiner. Following a discussion Mr Egan was invited to record his version of events which he agreed to do. In his letter Mr Egan asserted that Lt. Pat O'Mahony the executive officer had said "I'll take my orders from you chief" suggesting that Chief E.R.A Egan was leading the fire control party. That is a nonsense and untrue. Lt. Pat O'Mahony led the fire control party in the boiler room hosing it down to dampen the flames ably supported by members of Cliona's crew. Independent eye witnesses have also corroborated Pat O'Mahony's efforts in articles published by journalist's who were on board LÉ Cliona during the live fire exercise. 1.Cork Examiner 30 May 1962 - 2.Cork Examiner 30 May 1962:
For the purposes of the record, I am republishing Mr Egan's letter along with rebuttals:
Letter Received from Maurice Egan 31 August 2015:
Letter Sent by Peter Mulvany  19 October 2015:
Letter Sent by Peter Mulvany  26 August 2016:
Letter Sent by Peter Mulvany  03 October 2016:

Leading Stoker Banim:
A review of the selected transcripts suggests that some coordination of witness statements had been discussed post the fire and prior to the enquiry. In other jurisdictions coaching of witnesses in war crimes trials has been an issue. In the case of one other Irish Naval Service enquiry it was suspected that witnesses had discussed their evidence with each other prior to the hearing. Regardless, the evidence of witnesses to the enquiry investigating the LÉ Cliona boiler room fire has to be treated with caution. Leading Stoker Banim under oath states he was going to the heads (The Toilets) when the depth charge exploded. In fact there is evidence that Leading Stoker Banim had attempted to intervene with one other witness and persuade him to support his presence in the boiler room on the cross platform if questioned by investigators. As the ship was at action stations and supposed to be closed up, L/S Banim was in a cabin on the port side with the porthole open watching the fireworks "his term": In his sworn evidence to the Naval Court of Enquiry "L/S Banim stated, "he was on the cross platform of the Boiler Room as the fire started and saw the initial sheet of flame". On the contrary, witness evidence indicates that if Banim had been present at the time of the outbreak of the fire on the cross platform he would have been "toast":

The Engineering Officer: Lt. Foley:
Lt. Foley alleges he was in the engine room during action stations. Information received indicates Lt. Foley had retired to his cabin and had left his action station. It is also apparent that Lt. Foley, a direct entry officer, was unsuitable for service on a naval ship and but for the expertise of Lt. Phil Devitt, a reserve naval officer, who stepped in to support the fire fighting effort of the crew, matters could have been much worse. Following a critical determination by the Naval Court of Enquiry, Lt. Foley resigned his commission on the 16 November 1962:

Chief Petty Officer Stoker O'Callaghan: Prepare for Abandoning Ship:
At P5: Roy Hammond (RTE Cameraman, Ex Cork Examiner and Irish Press) who was on board LÉ Cliona records in his essay "Media Memories of Cork", Published 1994: "Meanwhile as is the usual procedure we were told, a ships boat was launched with a petty officer and four or five ratings aboard, and this pulled away to stand off a quarter of a mile and waited to observe what happened to the ship": Evidence clearly shows there was an order to "Prepare for Abandoning Ship" and the whaler was swung out on its davits and can be seen clearly in a photograph extracted from an RTE Film. Evidence communicated from a former member of Cliona's crew in 2016 indicated that Chief Petty Officer Stoker O'Callaghan despite the fact no order to abandon ship had been given, had departed in the whaler with others, including a serving future FLAG Officer and a Junior Officer, and stood off the stricken Cliona while the crew were engaged in fighting the fire. There was no order to abandon ship and that has been corroborated. The usual procedure is to wait for a direct order to abandon ship from the Captain and then abandon ship. (The Abandon Ship order may only be given by the Captain, or Officer in Charge of a vessel, if the Captain is incapacitated). The way individuals departed the stricken Cliona when the ship was in mortal danger raises questions. In 2016 Chief Petty Officer Stoker O'Callaghan was awarded posthumously a scroll of commendation for fighting the fire.

Lieutenant Patrick O'Mahony: Executive Officer
At P2: Report to the Chief of Staff from Captain Thomas McKenna on fire damage to LÉ Cliona, 31 May 1962 (Military Archives)": Captain McKenna in his official report records: “Special mention must be made of Executive Officer Lieut. O’Mahony who led the fire fighting by his own tenacity got it under control. Also of leading Stoker Myre (Mynes) who coolly turned off all connections and then continued to take his place in the fire fighting although injured by burning”:

 
(RTE Cameraman, Roy Hammond, Ex Cork Examiner and Irish Press) who was on board LÉ Cliona records in his essay "Media Memories of Cork", Published 1994. At P4: “Undisputed hero of the day was the ship's Executive Officer, Lieut. Pat O’Mahony of Tralee, and we watched as he went down into the inferno to fight the fire single-handed while other members of the fire-control party brought up two stoker ratings who had been on watch in the boiler-room and were badly injured”:
At P5: Mr Hammond records from his position on the bridge and on the boat deck of LÉ Cliona: “The situation improved as time passed. Approaching noon the flames and smoke seemed to be dying down but it wasn't until 1300hrs that a smoke blackened Pat O’Mahony came up to report the fire under control. The emergency was over although for another two hours buckets of water had to be passed down to the boiler room to cool off the oil tanks":
NOTE: Roy Hammond was a photojournalist for the Cork Examiner and before that the Irish Press. Originally from England Hammond moved to Cork after meeting, and marrying, his wife Rose Sheppard from Albert Road, Cork City, setting up a photography studio at 33 St Patrick’s Street. During World War II, Hammond served as a Photographer in the British Army Film and Photographic Unit, and he frequently flew with the 6th Airborne Division taking photographs of experimental loadings of troops and equipment prior to the 06 June 1944, D-Day: (See the history of the AFPU (Army Film Photographic Unit) on D-Day: Imperial War Museum Archive). After VE Day, in 1945, Hammond was appointed to the Imperial War Graves Commission in Berlin, (now known as the Commonwealth War Graves Commission), and spent the next two years attached there. His work included accompanying a medical officer who was exhuming bodies of RAF aircrew shot down over the Russian Zone of East Berlin. Roy would take detailed photos of their remains prior to their being reinterred in a military cemetery. This information was also conveyed to British Army War Crimes Investigators for their records. As well as his work as a press photographer for the Cork Examiner Hammond was a cameraman for RTÉ until his retirement in 1992. Following his retirement Roy was entertained in the officers mess on the Irish Naval Base located on Haulbowline Island. In attendance were Captain Eoin McNamara (Served as Ensign on LÉ Cliona during the fire), Commodore Joe Deasy (FLAG officer Commanding Naval Service), Captain Liam Brett (Officer Commanding Naval Base), Captain Bob Guthrie (Engineering Superindent Naval Service) and Lieut. Commander Charlie O'Donnell (Served as Ensign on LÉ Cliona during the fire) See Photo NS Officers Mess 1992: On his death in 1996 the Examiner obituary noted: "Roy covered all the major stories, both in Cork and nationally, he covered nearly every major story you could think of, he was a great newsman and a thorough gentleman."
Imperial War Museum Record for Roy Hammond:
Imperial War Museum records show there is an album and loose prints in their archive relating to the service of Roy (William) Hammond, who had served as a Serjeant of the Royal Engineers and was seconded from the Army Film and Photographic Unit to the 53 Graves Registration Unit in Berlin between 1945 and 1947. https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205224829

Causation: Premature Depth Charge Explosion, LÉ Cliona, 29 May 1962:
For years a rumour was circulated that the crew of LÉ Cliona were to blame for the premature depth charge explosion that caused the boiler room fire on the 29 May 1962. It was alleged that during the live fire exercise one of the depth charges had become jammed in the stern rails and efforts by the crew to release the DC had affected the depth setting causing the premature explosion. In other words the crew of LÉ Cliona were being unfairly blamed inferring they were negligent.
The court of enquiry dated 06 July 1962, advised that a premature explosion of a depth charge is not considered responsible for the following reasons. A premature explosion can only be caused by (1) a broken firing spring; (2) impact firing, in either of which case the charge would have exploded on the surface with disastrous results:"
Comment:
Unclassified British documents, show clearly that the British Admiralty had conducted Depth Charge Pistol Fuze Gun Comparative Trials from 1945-1947 using several types of Pistols which included the Mark 7 pistol, also used in the depth charges aboard LÉ Cliona. The British concluded inter alia:
1. In hydrostatically operated pistols, firing of a pistol by countermining is to be EXPECTED if another charge explodes when it is close to its set depth.
(Countermining: when one depth charge detonates the explosion sets of another depth charge dropped in the pattern. Note: Countermining was excluded by the Irish Naval Service as a cause of the premature explosion of a depth charge in the case of LÉ Cliona):
2. In cases of Mark 7 and 9 pistols, the nominal firing depth is NOT the expected firing depth.
3. In cases where a Mark 7 pistol is fitted, leakage (Water/Sea) into the primer tube may cause the pistol to fire shallow.
4. During tests, Leakage of sea water into the primer tube of the pistol was the undoubted explanation for the five shallow fires, of the 11 failures.
It was also concluded, that due to leakage (Water/Sea) about 12% of the hydrostatic type and 8% of the orifice type depth charge pistols will fail to fire, or will fire sufficiently far from their set depth to be classed as failures i.e fire shallow. Ironically 20 years earlier on the 30 March 1942, a similar type premature explosion resulting from a depth charge occurred on HMS Belwort (LÉ Cliona) causing the loss of one crewmember.
Countermining: Mark 7 Depth Charges: US Navy:
In August 1957, during the filming of the world war two Hollywood Movie The Enemy Below, eleven depth charges exploded prematurely off the stern of the USS Whitehurst (DE-634) 18 miles off Pearl Harbor, endangering the lives of a Hollywood movie cast who were on board to shoot a movie scene. The Press Report reads: "Exploding depth charges send water 100 feet into the air near the Navy's Destroyer Escort Whitehurst 18 miles from Pearl Harbour. A Hollywood movie crew aboard the ship narrowly escaped what the captain said could have been a serious accident. Among well known persons working on the film were actor Robert Mitchum, director Dick Powell and actress June Allyson. Eleven charges exploded prematurely (AP)". According to a former Senior Naval Officer USS Whitehurst: "This incident was done deliberately to achieve a dramatic explosion for effect, using a minimum depth setting with a slow ship's speed". A former crewmember who served on USS Whitehurst recalled  "We were told that the depth charges were set to go off at close to surface level so it would make a higher splash and be great for special effects. We almost blew our fantail off during one of those drops". 

The absence of enough lifejackets:
At P3: of  "Media Memories of Cork", Published 1994. Roy Hammond (RTE Cameraman, Ex Cork Examiner and Irish Press): Writes:  "Each member of crew of Cliona had their own lifejackets; extra ones were distributed to the " Passengers". The press party was the last to be attended to, a rather embarrassed (Sub Lieut.) Johnny Doyle, the Navy's press officer, offered the last remaining jacket to a party of five or six people": A Navy Ship involved in a live fire exercise proceeding to sea with not enough life jackets onboard shows a total disregard for the safety of its crew and passengers.

LÉ Aisling Engine Room Fire - 19 November 1981:
On the 19 November 1981, The LÉ Aisling was returning from Barry in Wales with a cargo of ordinance on the after deck when a fire in the engine room broke out and got out of control. Abandon Ship was ordered and the escort vessel was ordered to move off to 5 miles range in the event she might explode. Petty Officer Michael McIntyre and Chief Petty Officer Peter Tumulty eventually managed to extinguish the blaze and prevented a catastrophe. Both Tumulty and McIntyre were subsequently awarded Distinguished Service Medals for their actions. The similarities between the boiler room fire on board LÉ Cliona in 1962, and the engine room fire on board LÉ Aisling in 1981 was also reviewed. Following the Aisling enquiry, a recommendation for an award to Lieut. Pat O’Mahony and Able Stoker Mynes for their actions in fighting the fire on board LÉ Cliona 1962 was also submitted. However, no further action was taken in their case by the Department of Defence.

LE Cliona Crew List: https://www.irishseamensrelativesassociation.ie/LE-Cliona-Crewlist.29.05.1962.html

LÉ Cliona Crew Log: https://www.irishseamensrelativesassociation.ie/LE-Cliona-Log.29.05.1962.html 

Friday 25th Sept 2020: Seascapes, RTÉ Radio One, Maritime Programme: In discussion with Fergal Keane, Bill Mynes, ex Able Stoker LÉ Cliona (Discharged Petty Officer Stoker 1964) recalls the boiler room fire on board the Corvette following a premature depth charge explosion during a live firing exercise while at sea on the 29th May 1962: https://fb.watch/eokCpkj2IN/    

LÉ Cliona Fire Revisited: RTE Film: Recorded 29th May 1962: https://fb.watch/eol3Bdw3cN/ 

Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/LECliona

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